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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to analyze a class of voting games in which external-
ities are present. We consider a society in which coalitions can be formed and where a ﬁnite
number of voters have to choose among a set of alternatives. A coalition is winning if it can
veto any proposed alternative. In our model, the veto power of a coalition is dependent on
the coalition formation of the outsiders. We show that whether or not the core is non-empty
depends crucially on the expectations of each coalition regarding outsiders’ behavior when it
wishes to veto an alternative. On the one hand, if each coalition has pessimistic expectations,
then the core is non-empty if and only if the dimension of the set of alternatives is equal to
one. On the other hand, if each coalition has optimistic expectations, the non-emptiness of
the core is not ensured.
Keywords: voting games; externalities; core
1. Introduction
Voting games represent a special class of cooperative games in which some coalitions of voters have
the power to enforce their will regardless other voters’ actions, while the remaining coalitions are pow-
erless to inﬂuence the outcome. A natural concept to predict the outcome of a vote is the core. An
alternative belongs to the core if there does not exist some alternative and a winning group of voters in
favor of changing the status quo to that alternative. Although voting games constitute a rather special
class of cooperative games, the existence of a core alternative is by no mean ensured: the famous “para-







































0Version November 29, 2010 submitted to Games 2 of 8
The classiﬁcation of voting games according to the emptiness or non-emptiness of the core has been
the object of a wide literature. Consider a society in which coalitions can be formed and where a ﬁnite
number, n 2 N, of voters have to choose an alternative from a set in the p-dimensional Euclidean space
Rp. Assuming that the preference relation over the set of alternatives of each voter is continuous and
convex, Greenberg [2] showed that if the set of winning coalitions of a voting game consists of all coali-
tions with more than pn=(p + 1) individuals then the core is non-empty. In the same way, Nakamura
[5] determined the upper bound on the cardinality of the set of alternatives of a voting game, called the
Nakamura number, which would guarantee the existence of a core alternative. The Nakamura number
is deﬁned as the size of the smallest collection of winning coalitions having an empty intersection. If
such a collection does not exist, then the Nakamura number is equal to inﬁnity. So, the non-emptiness of
the core is directly related to the combinatorial structure of the winning coalitions. Schoﬁeld [6], Strnad
[7] and Le Breton [4] have generalized Greenberg’s result [2] to arbitrary voting games. More precisely,
they prove that if p is smaller than or equal to the Nakamura number of a voting game minus two, and
if individual preference relations are continuous and convex then the core is non-empty. Otherwise, if
p is strictly greater than the Nakamura number of a voting game minus two, there exists a proﬁle of
preference relations for which the core is empty.
Coalition formation games with externalities were ﬁrst modeled by Thrall and Lucas [8] as partition
function games. For this class of games, Hafalir [3] shows that a convexity property ensures the non-
emptiness of the core with singletons and pessimistic expectations.1 Funaki and Yamato [1] study the
core of an economy with a common pool resource by means of partition function games. On the one
hand, if each coalition has pessimistic expectations, then the core is non-empty. On the other hand, if it
has optimistic expectations, the core is empty when there are more than four players.
In continuation of these works, we study the class of voting games with externalities. In particular,
we investigate whether it is possible to guarantee the non-emptiness of the core when each coalition is
embedded into a partition. A coalition embedded into a partition is winning if it can veto any proposed
alternative. Contrary to voting games without externalities, a coalition can be winning for a partition and
non-winning for another partition. In other words, whether or not a coalition is winning depends on the
coalition formation of the outsiders, and de facto, the non-emptiness of the core too.
On the one hand, assume that the members of a coalition pessimistically expect that the outsiders
react in the worst possible way for them when they wish to veto an alternative. In the present model, this
will correspond to the case where outsiders will form the largest possible coalition. We prove that the
core is non-empty if and only if the dimension of the set of alternatives is equal to one.
On the other hand, assume that the members of a coalition optimistically expects that the outsiders react
in the best way for them when they wish to veto an alternative. In the present model, this will corre-
spond to the case where each outsider will form a singleton. We show that there always exists a proﬁle
of preference relations for which the core is empty. Therefore, whether or not the core is non-empty
depends crucially on the expectations of each coalition about outsiders’ behavior when it wishes to veto
an alternative.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes voting games with externalities. In section
3 we prove that the core is non-empty when each coalition has a pessimistic view regarding the coali-
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tion formation of the outsiders. In section 4, we show that there exists a proﬁle of preference relations
for which the core is empty when expectations of each coalition are optimistic regarding the coalition
formation of the outsiders. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.
2. The model
The society consists of a set of voters N = f1;:::;ng where n  3. The voters have to choose an
alternative from a nonempty, convex and compact set X  Rp, p 2 N. Each voter i 2 N has preferences
represented by a complete preorder i over X. We denote by P the set of complete preorders over X.
A proﬁle of preference relations is an element = (1;:::;n) 2 Pn. We denote by Pco  P the set
of continuous,2 convex3 and complete preorders over X.
We denote by S(N) and (N) the sets of all non-empty coalitions and all partitions of N respectively.
Let S and  be the representative elements of S(N) and (N) respectively. We denote by S(i) the
unique coalition S 2  containing voter i. Let W e be a correspondence deﬁned from (N) to S(N) that
associates to each partition  2 (N) a (possibly empty) set of winning coalitions such that W e()  .
Throughout this article, we assume that W e satisﬁes the two following conditions:
- Properly (P): for any  2 (N), S 2 W e() implies T 62 W e() for each T 2  where T 6= S;
- Splitting of Outsiders (SO): for any  2 (N) and any 0 2 (N) such that S 2  \ 0 and
S0(i)  S(i) for each i 2 NnS, S 2 W e() implies S 2 W e(0).
Condition (P) means that any partition  2 (N) admits at most one winning coalition while condition
(SO) speciﬁes that a winning coalition S 2 S(N) for a partition  2 (N) is still winning when the
other coalitions embedded into  split into smaller groups.
Deﬁnition 1 A voting game (with externalities) is a pair (N;W e) where N is a set of voters and W e is
a correspondence of winning coalitions.
As discussed in the introduction, the core seems to be a natural concept to predict the outcome of
a vote. When externalities are present, the outcome of a vote will depend on the expectations of each
coalition S regarding the coalition formation of the outsiders when it wishes to veto an alternative. In
this way, we have to make assumptions about what a coalition conjectures about outsiders’ behavior
while deﬁning the core. In this article, we focus on the two extreme cases of pessimistic and optimistic
expectations. By (P) and (SO), the worst coalition formation for S is that outsiders form the largest
possible coalition which corresponds to m = fS;NnSg, and the best coalition formation for S is that
each outsider forms a singleton which corresponds to s = fSg[ffjg : j 2 NnSg. Thus, voting games
satisfying (P) and (SO) have positive externalities in the sense that a splitting of the outsiders makes
coalition S stronger.
Deﬁnition 2 Let (N;W e) be a game and take  2 fm;sg. The core with -expectations is the set of all
alternatives that will not be vetoed by a winning coalition, i.e.
2A preorder i over X is continuous if for all x 2 X, the sets fy 2 X : x i yg and fy 2 X : y i xg are closed relative
to X.












































x 2 X : S 2 W
e() =) @y 2 X : 8i 2 S; y i x
	
.4
The connections between Cm(N;W e) and Cs(N;W e) are emphasized by the following result.
Proposition 1 Let (N;W e) be a game. Then Cs(N;W e)  Cm(N;W e).




and y 2 X such that y i x for each i 2 S. By (P) and (SO), we know that S is
the unique winning coalition for all  2 (N) such that S 2 . In particular, this is true for s which
contradicts the assumption that x 2 Cs(N;W e). 
3. The core under pessimistic expectations
In this section, we study the core in the case where the expectations of each coalition are pessimistic.
For this purpose, we introduce the associated voting game without externalities (N;Wpes) where Wpes is
the set of winning coalitions facing the largest possible coalition. Formally,
(3.1) Wpes = fS 2 S(N) : S 2 W
e(m)g




x 2 X : S 2 Wpes =) @y 2 X : 8i 2 S; y i x
	
.
The result below establishes an equivalence between Cm(N;W e) and C(N;Wpes).
Fact 1 Let (N;W e) be a game. If we consider the transformation from (N;W e) to (N;Wpes) given by
(3:1), then Cm(N;W e) = C(N;Wpes).
Proof: The proof follows directly from (3.1). 
As discussed in the introduction, Nakamura [5] proves that the non-emptiness of the core of a voting
game (without externalities) (N;W) is directly related to the combinatorial structure of its winning
coalitions.
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The set
T
C2W C is called the collegium of (N;W) and its members the vetoers. If it is empty, then the
game (N;W) is non-collegial.
Among the voting games, the quota games have received much attention. A quota game is a voting
game (N;W) such that there exists an integer q  n satisfying S 2 W if and only if jSj  q. For these
games, it has been proved the following result:
Lemma 1 Let(N;W)beaquotagame. ThenitsNakamuranumberisgivenbyv(N;W) = [n=(n q)].5
For voting games (without externalities), a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the non-emptiness
of the core has been provided by Le Breton [4].
Theorem 1 (Le Breton [4]) Let (N;W) be a game. Suppose that X is a nonempty, convex and compact
subset of Rp, p 2 N. Then,
(i) if dimX  v(N;W)   2, then for all 2 Pn
co, it holds that C(N;W) 6= ;;6
(ii) if dimX  v(N;W)   1, then there exists 2 Pn
co such that C(N;W) = ;.
In order to prove the main theorem of this section, we need the following lemma:




T 2 W e 
fT;NnTg

we have S \ T 6= ;.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that S \ T = ;. Since S 2 W e 
fS;NnSg

, (SO) implies that
S 2 W e 
fS;T;Nn(S [ T)g

. By (P), we know that T 62 W e 
fS;T;Nn(S [ T)g

. We conclude from
(SO) that T 62 W e 
fT;NnTg

, a contradiction. 
Lemma 2 establishes that the game (N;Wpes) is proper, i.e. S 2 Wpes and T 2 Wpes implies that
S \ T 6= ;.
Theorem 2 For any game (N;W e), it holds that Cm(N;W e) 6= ; for all 2 Pn
co if and only if dimX =
1.
Proof: (=)) Assume that dimX = 1. Pick any game (N;W e) and consider the associated game
(N;Wpes) as in (3.1). By Lemma 2 we know that S\T 6= ; for any coalition S 2 Wpes and any coalition
T 2 Wpes. For the game (N;Wpes) this implies that v(N;Wpes) > 2. Since dimX = 1, we conclude by
Theorem 1 that C(N;Wpes) 6= ; for all 2 Pn
co. We conclude from Fact 1 that Cm(N;W e) 6= ; for all
2 Pn
co.
((=) Assume that Cm(N;W e) 6= ; for all 2 Pn
co. In order to prove the necessary part of the condition,
we have to construct a correspondence W e (satisfying (P) and (SO)) such that Cm(N;W e) 6= ; for all
2 Pn
co only if dimX = 1. We distinguish four cases:
(a) Assume that n  6. For any  2 (N), let us deﬁne W e by
(3.2) W
e() = fS 2 S(N) : 8T 2 ; T 6= S; jSj > jTjg
5[x] is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
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Clearly, W e satisﬁes (P) and (SO). Moreover, under pessimistic expectations we have
Wpes = fS 2 S(N) : jSj  n=2 + 1g.
Thus, when W e is deﬁned by (3:2) the corresponding voting game (N;Wpes) is a quota game. By using
Lemma 1, some elementary calculus show that v(N;Wpes) = 3 for any n  6.
(b)Assumethatn = 3. LetusdeﬁneW e asfollows: W e(ff1;2g;f3gg) = ff1;2gg, W e(ff1;3g;f2gg) =
ff1;3gg, W e(ff2;3g;f1gg) = ff2;3gg, and for all other partitions  2 (N), W e() = ;.
(c) Assume that n = 4. Let us deﬁne W e as follows: for all 34 2 (Nnf1;2g), W e(ff1;2gg [ 34) =
ff1;2gg, for all 24 2 (Nnf1;3g), W e(ff1;3gg [ 24) = ff1;3gg, for all 14 2 (Nnf2;3g),
W e(ff2;3gg [ 14) = ff2;3gg, and for all other partitions  2 (N), W e() = ;.
(d) Assume that n = 5. Let us deﬁne W e as follows: for all 345 2 (Nnf1;2g), W e(ff1;2gg[345) =
ff1;2gg, for all 245 2 (Nnf1;3g), W e(ff1;3gg [ 245) = ff1;3gg, for all 145 2 (Nnf2;3g),
W e(ff2;3gg [ 145) = ff2;3gg, and for all other partitions  2 (N), W e() = ;.
For any n 2 f3;4;5g, W e satisﬁes (P) and (SO). Moreover, we have Wpes = ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3gg,
and so v(N;Wpes) = 3.
In all cases (a), (b), (c) and (d), we conclude from Theorem 1 and Fact 1 that Cm(N;W e) 6= ; for all
2 Pn
co only if dimX = 1. 
4. The core under optimistic expectations
In this section, we study the core in the case where the expectations of each coalition are optimistic.
For this purpose, we introduce the associated voting game without externalities (N;Wopt) where Wopt is
the set of winning coalitions facing singletons. Formally,
(4.1) Wopt = fS 2 S(N) : S 2 W
e(s)g




x 2 X : S 2 Wopt =) @y 2 X s.t. 8i 2 S; y i x
	
.
The result below establishes an equality between Cs(N;W e) and C(N;Wopt).
Fact 2 Let (N;W e) be a game. If we consider the transformation from (N;W e) to (N;Wopt) given by
(4:1) then Cs(N;W e) = C(N;Wopt).
Proof: The proof follows directly from (4.1). 
Under optimistic expectations, we obtain the opposite result to the one under pessimistic expectations.
Theorem 3 For any dimX 2 N, there exists a game (N;W e) and a proﬁle of preference relations
2 Pn
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Proof: We distinguish two cases:
(a) Assume that n  4. Take W e deﬁned by (3:2). In this case, under optimistic expectations we have
Wopt = fS 2 S(N) : jSj  2g.
Note that (N;Wopt) is a quota game and its Nakamura number is given by [n=(n 2)] = 2 for any n  4.
(b) Assume that n = 3. Let us deﬁne W e as follows: W e(ff1g;f2g;f3gg) = f1g, W e(ff1g;f2;3gg) =
f2;3g, and for all other partitions  2 (N), W e() = ;. In this case, we have Wopt = ff1g;f2;3gg,
and so v(N;Wopt) = 2.
In both cases (a) and (b), we conclude from Theorem 1 and Fact 2 that for any dimX 2 N, there exists
a game (N;W e) and a proﬁle of preference relations 2 Pn
co such that Cs(N;W e) = ;. 
5. Concluding remarks
For the class of voting games with externalities, we have showed that if each coalition has pessimistic
expectations, then the core is non-empty if and only if the dimension of the set of alternatives is equal
to one. If each coalition has optimistic expectations, we have proved that the non-emptiness of the core
is not ensured. Thus, as in Funaki and Yamato [1] in the case of an economy with a common pool
resource, whether or not the core is non-empty depends crucially on the expectations of each coalition
about outsiders’ behavior when it wishes to veto an alternative.
Our core existence results hold for a large class of voting games with externalities since we only im-
pose the two natural properties (P) and (SO) on the correspondence W e. A natural extension of our
work would be to impose other properties on W e in order to study another class of voting games with
externalities.
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